Eleanor F. Fitzpatrick v. State Tax Commission of Utah : Brief of Defendant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1963
Eleanor F. Fitzpatrick v. State Tax Commission of
Utah : Brief of Defendant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Pratt Kesler; M. Reed Hunter; Attorneys for Defendant; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy;
David E. Salisbury; Malcolm D. Pike; Attorneys for Plaintiff;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Fitzpatrick v. State Tax Comm. Of Utah, No. 9819 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4166
IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
~~ !r~~--\ 
.oF THE STA(E1q! ~TA)H 
---·-- ") H]53 
. '' ~~ .... , I .J 
ELEANOR F. FITZPATRICK, 1 PZOti:n:fiffJ_ .. ~ :-.~ c~~ri:;-u"t:ili-
I 
I 
l 
-vs.-
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Case 
No. 9819 
lJNIVERSIT'l 01 
JUN3 0 1~ 
BRIEF OF DEFEND~NT JAW J..IBRJ 
[. 
t .. -. 
Writ of Certiorari to Review an Order of the 
State Tax Commission of Utah 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
M. REED HUNTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
. Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
David E:Salis bury 
Malcolm D. Pike 
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE.......................................... 1 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION.................... 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL...................................................... 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................... 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY THE PLAINTIFF, 
MRS. FITZPATRICK, UNDER AGREEMENT EN-
TERED INTO BY HER LATE HUSBAND AND THE 
KEARNS-TRIBUNE CORPORATION, ARE INCOME 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH INCOME TAX 
4 
STATUTES .................................................................................... 4 
POINT II. 
THE PAYMENTS HEREIN INVOLVED ARE NOT 
CAPITAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE RULE 
OF LAW THAT CAPITAL IS NOT A PROPER SUB-
JECT OF INCOME TAX, AND PLAINTIFF IS NOT 
ENTITUED TO HAVE AN EXEMPTION IN AN 
AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE VALUE THE CONTRACT 
WAS GIVEN FOR UTAH INHERITANCE TAX 
PURPOSES .................................................................................... 11 
POINT III. 
THE CONTRACT HERE INVOLVED IS NOT AN 
ANNUITY CONTRACT, NOR ARE THE PAYMENTS 
ANNUITY PAYMENTS WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
TITLE 59, CHAPTER 14, SECTION 4(2)(b), U.C.A.1953.... 15 
CONCLUSION 24 
Cases Cited 
L Bausch's Estate v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 186 Fed .. 
2d 313 (1951) ················································-······························· 7, 9-10 
"' Burgseth v. Zinsmaster Packing Co., 252 Minn. 63, 
89 N.W. 2d 172 (1958) ............... ·-················································· 22 
v Carrogan v. C. I. R., 197 Fed. 2d 246 (1952).................................... 8 
'- Carter v. Rector, 88 Okla. 12, 210 Pac. 1035 (1922).................... 12 
. ~'19 .J Clark v. Peterson, 78 Anz. 297, ~ P.· 451 (1955).................... 22 
(__.Commissioners of Corporations and Taxation v. Hale, 
315 Mass. 556, 53 N.E. 2d 675 (1944)........................................ 22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued) 
Page 
- Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189, 
64 L. Ed. 521 (1920)...................................................................... 12 
Estate of Mildred K. Hyde, 42 B. T. A. 739 (1940).......................... 22 
'-· Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U. S. 365, 54 S. Ct. 221, 
78 L. Ed. 365 (1933).................................................................... 22 
t-- Hooker v. Hoey, 27 F. Supp. 489 (1939) ............................................ 21-22 
L Inland Steel v. N. L. R. B., 170 F. 2d 247 (1948)............................ 22 
'- In re Clark's Estate, 10 Ut. 2d 427, 354 P. 2d 112 (1960) ................ 18-19 
c In re Ellertson's Estate, 157 Kan. 492, 142 P. 2d 724 (1943)........ 16 
In re Fuller's Estate, 83 N.Y. S. 2d 112, 193 Misc. 531 (1948).... 17 
c Jones v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2 T. C. 924 (1943) 23 
Kneeland v. Administrator, 138 Conn. 630, 88 Atl. 2d 376 (1952) 22 
Packard v. U.S., 179 F. Supp. 508 (1959)........................................ 9 
Salz v. State House Commission, 18 N. J. 106, 
112 Atl. 2d 716 (1955)................................................................ 22 
L--- Sanborn v. McCanless, 181 Tenn. 150, 178 S.W. 2d 765 (1943).... 16 
State Tax Commission v. Gray, 340 Mass. 535, 
165 N.E. 2d 404 (1960)................................................................ 23 
""~- Varnedoe v. Allen, 158 F. 2d 467 (1946)--------------------------------········ 9 
· Weaver Bros. v. District of Columbia, D. of C. C. C. H. Tax 
Reporter 1200-022 ( 1962) .............................................................. 7-8 
._ Wolfe v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 8 T. C. 689 (1947) 22 
Statutes Cited 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 691.. ............... _______________________________ 23 
31-11-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953 .................................................... 19-20 
59-14-4(2) (b), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ............................ 1, 15-16, 25 
59-14-4(2) (c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953...................................... 13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE ST A T'E OF UTAH 
ELEANOR F. FITZPATRICK, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendarnt. 
Case 
No. 9819 
BRIEF O·F DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case comes to this Court on appeal from the de-
cision of the State Tax Commission. 
The question presented is whether or not payments 
received by plaintiff in 1960 under the terms of a de-
ferred compensation agreement entered into by her late 
husband and his employer are income within the mean-
ing of 59-14-4, U. C. A. 1953. 
Plaintiff contends exemption should be allowed under 
the provisions of 59-14-4(2) (b), U. C. A. 1953, until she 
has received the amount to which the agreement in ques-
tion was valued for Utah inheritance tax purposes. De-
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fendant contends that she 1s not entitled to such 
exemption. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION 
After consideration of the facts and the law, the Tax 
Commission concluded that the deficiency assessment 
was in order, and by decision dated December 6, 1962, 
sustained the same. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant agrees with plaintiff's statement as to the 
relief sought on appeal in this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action centers on an agreement (R. 20-27) en-
tered into on June 27, 1960, by the !{earns-Tribune Cor-
poration and John F. Fitzpatrick, plaintiff's husband and 
president of the corporation. 
Mr. Fitzpatrick had rendered the corporation serv-
ices of exceptional value in a variety of capacities over 
an extended period of time. In consideration of these 
services and in consideration of certain promised future 
services, the corporation agreed to pay l\Ir. Fitzpatrick, 
or in the event of his death Mrs. Fitzpatrick, certain sums 
until the aggregate of such payments reached $250,000, 
or until both parties passed on, whichever occurred first 
(R. 21-23). 
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Mr. Fitzpatrick died on September 11, 1960. He had 
received no payments under this agreement prior to his 
death, but the corporation immediately commenced mak-
ing such payments to Mrs. Fitzpatrick, which payments 
continue to this date (R. 17). In 1960, she received 
$8,333.32 in four equal payments of $2,083.33. 
The contract was given a value for estate tax pur-
poses and was included in the decedent's gross estate. 
The prescribed tax on this and other parts of the estate 
was paid without protest (R. 18). 
This contract was also included in Mr. Fitzpatrick's 
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. In addition, 
the payments received by Mrs. Fitzpatrick in 1960 were 
included in taxable income for federal income tax pur-
poses, and a tax paid thereon (R. 3). 
Payments made in 1960 were deducted from gross 
income as ''payments under deferred compensation 
agreement" by the Kearns-Tribune Corporation in its 
corporate franchise tax return for the year 1960 (R. 18). 
Mrs. Fitzpatrick did not report the payments re-
ceived under this contract in her Utah income tax return 
for 1960. A deficiency assessment was made by the Audit-
ing Division of the Tax Commission, and a tax in the 
amount of $316.59 assessed against her (R. 3-15). 
Plaintiff filed timely protest and petition to the Tax 
Commission, and that body, after consideration of writ-
ten evidence, oral argument and memorandums submit-
ted by both sides sustained the deficiency assessment 
(R. 1-2, 35-37). 
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A stipulation of facts (R. 17-19) was entered into by 
the parties to this action. The findings of fact (R. 35-36), 
with the exception of Numbers 2, 9, 10, 11 and 12, are 
based upon that stipulation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF, MRS. FITZPATRICK, UNDER 
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY HER 
LATE HUSBAND AND THE KEARNS-TRIB-
UNE CORPORATION, ARE INCOl\t!E WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF UTAH INCOME TAX 
STATUTES. 
Section 59-14-4(1) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
provides as follows : 
''Gross income includes gains, profits and income 
derived from salaries, wages or compensation for 
personal' service of whatever kind and in what-
ever form paid ... and income derived from any 
source whatever.'' 
Compen~~~ti<:>.P:i.2.!: pers~~~L~ervi~e_is exactly what we 
are dealing with in this case. 
The agreement between Mr. Fitzpatrick and the 
Kearns-Tribune Corporation provides that Mr. Fitzpat-
rick, or in the event of his death, Mrs. Fitzpatrick, is to 
receive $25,000.00 a year from the Kearns-Tribune Cor-
poration as : 
1. _Deferred compensation for valuable services pre-
viously rendered. 
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2. Qompe,Ilsation for services to be performed in the 
futurel!y_ Mr. Fitzpatrick until the time of his death. 
This double motive is made clear by the following 
language from the agreement: 
"WHEREAS, it is recognized that Fitzpatrick's 
service to the Corporation over the years have 
been rendered for compensation which has been 
far from commensurate with the responsibility 
involved and the value to the Corporation of such 
services ... (R. 20) 
''WHEREAS, the Corporation desires that Fitz-
patrick shall remain in its service and desires to 
continue to receive the benefit of his knowledge, 
experience, reputation and contacts for as long 
as he is able to render services and is willing to 
offer him an incentive to continue in the form of 
retirement compensation ... " ( R. 21) 
Mr. Fitzpatrick's future duties under this contract 
are specified therein. He was to 
'' ... perform such advisory and consultative serv-
ices and attend such meetings of the officers or the 
Board of Directors or stockholders as may, from 
time to time, be reasonably requested, to the end 
that the Corporation may continue to have the 
benefit of his experience and knowledge of the 
business and affairs of the Corporation and of his 
reputation and contacts in the newspaper publish-
ing industry, and he shall be available for advice 
and counsel to the officers and directors of the Cor-
poration at all reasonable times by telephone, let~ 
ter or in person; ... " (R. 24) 
This document binds both parties to certain duties 
and grants both parties certain specified rights. It even 
contains a forfeiture clause (see page 18 of this brief) 
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providing that if Mr. Fitzpatrick fails to abide by his 
obligation under the contract the corporation would be 
relieved of its obligation to pay him or his wife the stip-
ulated compensation. 
It is interesting to note the frequency vdth which 
the term ''compensation'' is used throughout the agree-
ment - the very word our tax statutes employ in de-
fining gross income for income tax purposes. 
The agreement is without title. It was characterized 
by all parties early in the negotiations as a "deferred 
compensation agreement." This is probably as good a 
designation as any. While it is undoubtedly true, as pe-
titioner's brief points out (page 20), that the term lacks 
the precision of a chemical formula, it is nonetheless not 
so vague or meaningless as to be valueless. This agree-
ment involves compensation to be given by one party 
thereto to the other in return for services, all or part of 
which have been, or are to be, performed prior to the time 
the compensation is to be received. This term has increas-
ing usage in the business world. The Kearns-Tribune 
Corporation used it in deducting these Yery payments 
from gross income on its state corporate franchise tax 
returns. The phrase certainly has no magic, but we will 
use it in reference to the contract in question for want of 
a better term. 
What is significant about the contract, whatever its 
designation, is that it is a contract of employment provid-
in,g for the payment of compensation for personal serv-
ices, and compensation for personal services is income f<?}-. 
income tax purposes in the State of Utah. We thus re-
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spectfully take issue with plaintiff's contention that ''a 
simple reading of this section demonstrates that the 
transaction in question is not clearly included or exclud-
ed from the category of income ... " (page 11, petitioner's 
brief). These monies would have been income or compen-
sation to Mr. Fitzpatrick as the words are generally un-
derstood in almost any context. We shall endeavor to 
demonstrate that they ar~_ also income to l\1!'8..· Fitzpatri~~-
It has previously been pointed out that the Kearns-
Tribune Corporation deducted the payments herein made 
as compensation paid, to-wit, as "payments made under 
compensation agreement." It is clear that if there is 
compensation ~9- by the payer for income tax purposes 
there is almost always compensation received by the 
payee for income tax purposes. These monies are not all 
things to all people, capable of changing nature as a 
chameleon changes its color. Plaintiff attempts to give 
this point (page 8 of brief) a dismissal after a once-over-
lightly by arguing that this deduction by the corporation 
is irrelevant and perhaps even erroneous. The Tax Com-
mission take the position that the deduction is neither. A 
very recent case supports this assertion. Weaver Bros. v. 
District of Columbia (1962), D. of Col. C.C.H. Tax Re-
porter 1200-022, he1<JJ.I-t::~,_tp~yments to widows of deceas~d 
em,p!()_y~~s @g_~_reontracts such as the instant agreement 
are includable as income to the widow and deductible by 
the payt-ggeorporation - the identical treatment given 
regular salaries, to which they are analogous. See also 
Bausch's Estale v. Commission of Internal Revenue (2nd 
Cir., 1951), 186 Fed. 2d 313. 
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The Weaver case is merely one of a line of case~ 
standing for the proposition that it does not matter for 
income tax purposes whether the employee receives the 
monies under such a contract befor~ his death, or whether 
his widow receives them ther~af~!'_. Admittedly, it would 
be much easier to visualize the payments as income if Mr. 
Fitzpatrick, who actually performed the services for 
which the compensation is given, were the recipient rath-
er than his widow. It might be argued that since Mr. 
Fitzpatrick did in fact furnish the consideration for the 
contract, the monies might well be income to him but not 
to his wife, who admittedly performed no services. Such 
contention cannot be sustained. H~r right to receive 
thes~ pa_yme:g.ts_F~~ ~.Q~J11Je in t_~~ contract, with her 
husband's past and promised future activities providing 
con§id~r-~t_ion for this right. The law is clear that past 
considerations can support payments of this nature. A 
typical case dealing with that problem is Carrogan v. 
C. I. R. (2nd Cir., 1952), 197 Fed. 2d 246. The Court held 
that past consideration is a Yalid exchange for present 
compensation of an employee so as to render such com-
pensation taxable income. 
The fact, then, that _i\Ir. Fitzpatrick is deceased and 
not able to further serve the corporation affects neither 
the validity of the agreement nor the nature of the pay-
ments. The services provided consideration, which flows 
to the payor, for these deferred compensation payments. 
A leading case in the line dealing with the question 
of whether or not payments receiYed under deferred com-
pensation and similar agreements to widows of ex-em-
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ployees are income, is Varn.edoe v. Allen. (1946), 158 Fed. 
2d 467, cert. den. 330 U. S. 821, 91 L. Ed. 1272, 67 S. Ct. 
771. The Court held as follows (p. 468): 
"It is not necessary that the services should have 
been rendered by the payee. The payer is the one 
to ·whom the services must have been renderd ... 
They are gross income to her as compensa.tion for 
services rendered . .. " (Emphasis supplied) 
Another case, Packard v. U. B. (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 
1959) 179 F. Supp. 508, held similarly (p. 511): 
''Payments made by an employer to a beneficiary 
made pursuant to an enforceable contract between 
employer and employee are not gifts even though 
the beneficiary has done nothing to earn them.'' 
Federal tax regulations have also come to stand for 
the proposition that the important thing in this context 
is that services were in fact rendered to the employer for 
which compensation is given. From Bausch's Estate, 
supra, (p. 314): 
''The taxpayer relies on I. T. 3329, 1939-2 C. B. 
153, which ruled that a salary of a deceased officer, 
if continued for a limited period and paid to his 
widow, would be deductible by the corporation as 
a business expense but nevertheless would be a 
non-taxable gift in her hands. The reason given 
was that: 
'When an allowance is paid by an organiza-
tion to which the recipient has rendered no 
service, the amount is determined to be a gift 
or gratuity and is J1:9J subject to federal in-
come tax in the hands of the receipient.' 
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"I. T. 3329 has recently been modified, however, 
so as to apply only to the situation where no 
services have been rendered to the employer either 
by the recipient or anybody else. I. T. 4027 1950-
21 Int. Rev. Bull. 2. In the case at bar the pay-
ments were a reward for services performed for 
the employer. That alone should be enough to ren-
der the payments taxable. " (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
There are admittedly factual distinctions from the 
Bausch case in the case at bar, but they are not such as 
to emasculate the legal principle involved. 
Plaintiff's brief claims that these cases, admitted to 
be part of ''numerous federal cases involving corporate 
payments to widows of deceased executive employees", 
have no bearing upon the issue at hand, because the ques-
tion raised was whether the payments \vere gifts or in-
come to the widows. 
These cases have held that these payments were not 
gifts but income, and in holding that they are income they 
are certainly persuasive. If the Court finds that such pay-
ments constitute income in Utah, and further finds that 
they are not covered by specific exemption from taxable 
income, this case will, of necessity, be resolved in the de-
fendant's favor. 
The above cited cases deal with federal tax pro-
visions comparable to our own and are thus not abso-
lutely binding on this Court. They must be allotted con-
siderable persuasive force, however, especially in light of 
the fact that there is no relevant case law from any juris-
diction to the contrary. 
10 
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It is interesting to note _that plaintiff, i~ fact, pai~ 
fe_dexaljJ1come tax on the monies received under this con-
tract for _th~ __ _year ill. question-' 
The State Tax Commission thus respectfully con-
tends that these payments are ''!!!~orne'' within the 
meaning of our income tax statutes. Unless exempted 
they are taxable income. The remainder of this brief will 
devote itself to the question of whether or not these pay-
ments are in fact entitled to exemption. 
II. 
THE PAYMENTS HEREIN INVOLVED ARE 
NOT CAPITAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
THE RULE OF LAW THAT CAPITAL IS NOT 
A PROPER SUBJECT OF INCOME TAX, AND 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE 
AN EXEMPTION IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO 
THE VALUE THE CONTRACT WAS GIVEN 
FOR UTAH INHERITANCE TAX PURPOSES. 
The first argument advanced in plaintiff's brief is 
that these payments are not subject to income tax because 
they are capital, inasmuch as the contract in question 
was valued for inheritance tax purposes. 
Since the income tax exacts revenues from ''income'' 
as opposed to "capital," these are key concepts and a 
brief examination of their meaning and relationship to 
each other is merited. 
"Capital" is the amount of wealth a person has at 
any given time. ''Income'' is an influx of wealth, de-
11 
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rived from capital and/or labor. This relationship 1s 
clarified by the following quotes: 
"Income is the fruit of capital; capital is the 
source of income.'' Carter v. Rector, (1922) 88 
Okla. 12, 210 Pac. 1035, 1037. 
''Income may de defined as the gain derived from 
capital, from labor or effort, or both combined . 
. . . [It is] severed from the capital, however in-
vested or employed, and coming in, being derived, 
that is, received or drawn by the recipient for his 
separate use, benefit, and disposal.'' Eisner v. 
Macomber (1920), 252 U.S. 189, 207; 40 S. Ct. 189, 
193; 64 L. Ed. 521, 529. 
It is difficult upon occasion to distinguish income 
from recovered capital. To make this distinction, it is 
often necessary to inquire into pre-existing capital to de-
termine whether the fund in question represents an addi-
tion (income) or merely existing wealth in another form 
(recovery of capital or exchange of assets). Such inquiry 
into the present fact situationshows no actuaJ invest-
ment intothe_cgnt_ract on the part of Mrs. Fitpatrick and 
furthe_r __ tl!~i tJ!.es~_:I!!9}li~§ _re_pr~sent p~_:w __ wealth to he:r_ 
and not r.n~rely recovery of some asset or capital pre-
viou~o_s_~e_f?§_~d _by_ het. 
There is a legitimate _.equitable, as well as _a logical, 
reason for allowing recovery of investment before im-
posing an income tax. This is the explanation for recov-
ery of capital provided for in our code in the case of 
annuities, etc. The principle of tax-free recovery of 
actual investment cannot apply in this case, however, be-
12 
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cause there is no actual investment on the part of the 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff argues that the value given the contract for 
estate tax purposes is a "basis" which can be S)lbsti-
tuted for a<;tual iil.y:_~_st~~p.t. Since the logic behind the 
rule of law present is to allow tax-free recovery of actual 
investment, and the statutes in question provide for no 
such substitution, this argument must fail. 
Indeed, if these monies were ''capital'' ~-~e.E~~d by 
~Irs. Fitzpatrick from her deceased husl?and, it would not 
be necessary for petitioner to take the indirect, round-
about manner of argument for exemption chosen. The 
property would be specifically exempted under 
59-14-4(2) (c), which provides exemption for "the y_a111.~ 
of pro_perty acquired by gift, bequest, device or inheri-
tance.'' The legislative intent behind this exemption is 
again one of recovery-recovery of the investment actually 
made by the recipient or the decedent, as the case may be, 
in the property. As already pointed out, there is actually 
investment by neither Mrs. Fitzpatrick or her late hus-
band, and the monies would be income to either. 
Under terms of the contract, Mr. Fitzpatrick had no 
power to unilaterally change the rights of his wife. Her 
rights in the contract were independent and absolute, 
with the single contingency that she would receive the 
money only in the event of his death before $250,000 
was paid. The contract is reciprocal, possessing even a 
non-assignability clause (R. 26), and is not a,nalogous to 
an i11surance or annuity contract which would allow for 
U!!il~t-~:r~~ change of beneficiary. These transfers of 
13 
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monies under the contract were _!!Ot from Fitzpatrick to 
hi~~-~iq()_W_, but fro~J;ll,~~-~Q_:rporation to Mrs. Fitzpatrick. 
These monies are not "p~operty acquired by gift, be~ 
quest, devise or in_P.eritance. '' 
The inheritance tax was paid without protest as to 
its legality or appropriateness. The facts mentioned in 
the preceding paragraph leave no doubt that these monies 
are income for income tax purposes, but do leave some 
q~~~ti()_J! ~~t()_iQ~_Qropr~g_!_the_i~e:ritance tax. -~u~~-­
sequent research has indicated a split in American cases 
involving inheritance tax and deferred compensation 
agreements with alternate recipients. 
In this regard, the question of double taxation is not 
without significance. Plaintiff argued before the com-
mission that an unconstitutional double tax was being im-
posed. A new approach to this argument has been taken 
(see plaintiff's brief, page 10), but the basic question still 
remains. 
The constitutional prohibition against double taxa-
tion is a prohibition against multiple taxation of the same 
type of the same event or transaction. Since two differ-
ent taxes are here involved, the argument must fail. 
An example may help clarify the problem. A person 
earns income and pays income tax therein. With this 
income he buys a work of art, paying a sales tax on the 
transfer. Each year thereafter he pays an ad valorem 
tax on the same work of art. Here are three taxes on 
what is really the same asset (albeit in different forms). 
As plaintiff points out, there are indeed many situations 
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in which the appropriateness of the imposition of an in-
come tax and an inheritance tax on the same fund is be-
yond dispute. 
III 
THE CONTRACT HERE INVOLVED IS NOT 
AN ANNUITY CONTRACT, NOR ARE THE 
PAYMENTS ANNUITY PAYMENTS WITHIN 
THE ?\IEANING OF TITLE 59, CHAPTER 14, 
SECTION 4(2) (b), U. C. A. 1953. 
Plaintiff urges that the contract here involved is an 
annuity contract, and that the payments made to Mrs. 
Fitzpatrick are li:!!P.]:lj~ty payments and thus specifically 
exempted from the Utah Income Tax Law under Section 
59-14-4(2) (b). The contention of the Commission is that 
the agreement in question is not an annuity contract, and 
these payments are not annuity payments within the 
meaning of this exemption. 
Page 20 of plaintiff's brief points out the term 
"annuity" is capable of precise definition. This term is a 
technical, legal term of art describing contracts, pay-
ments, etc., possessing certain characteristics and attri-
butes which distinguish annuities from other installment 
payment agreements and arrangements. It is in this tech-
nical sense that the term is employed in tax exemption 
statutes. This is consistent with the time-honored rule of 
strict construction of exemptions. Some of these char-
acteristics of annuities are apparent in reading the stat-
ute which is here quoted in full (the federal law is 
similar): 
59-14-4(2). "The following items shall not be in-
cluded in gross income and shall be exempt from 
15 
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taxation under this chapter: 
"* * * 
'' (b) Amounts received, other than amounts paid 
by reason of the death of the insured and interest 
. 
payments on. such amounta, under a life insurance, 
_endowment__.Qr[ annuifr c~ but if such 
amounts, when added to amounts received before 
the taxable year under such contract, exceed the 
aggregate premiums or consideration paid wheth-
er or not paid during the taxable year, then the 
excess shall be included in gross income. In the 
case of a transfer for a valuable consideration, by 
assignment or otherwise, of a life insurance, en-
dowment or annuity contract, or any interest 
therein, only the actual value of such considera-
tion and the amount of the premiums and other 
sums subsequently paid by the transferee shall be 
exempt from taxation under this subsection or 
subsection ( 2) (a) of this section.'' 
Annuity contracts, in a strict legal sense, are con-
tracts purchased to provide payments to the purchaser 
to be mad~3:t a future time, employing an actuarial basis 
and mortality ta!?les (see page 15 of plaintiff's brief). 
Another distinguishing characteristic is made clear from 
the following: 
" 'b.nnuity' is a fix~_d amount directed to be paid 
abso1utely and without contingency.'' In re Ellert-
son's -Estate -(1943), 157 Kan. 492, 142 P. 2d 724, 
726. See also Sanborn v. McCanless (1943), 181 
Tenn. 150, 178 S.W. 2d 765. 
A typical definition of annuity is the following: 
''An 'annuity' in the strict sense is a payment to 
be made in all events and out of both income and 
16 
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principal of a trust as distinguished from a popu-
lar usage of' annuity' as being a fixed annual pay-
ment." In re Fuller's Estate (1948), 83 N.Y. S. 
2d 112, 113; 193 Misc. 531. 
These list some characteristics which distinguish annui-
ties from other installment payment arrangements. There 
are others, but these are clearly sufficient to establish that 
the contract about which the instant case evolves is simply 
not an annuity contract. No actuarial basis was used, 
and the contract was certainly not purchased but is 
merely a typical contract of employment. Contingencies 
were written into the contract. In addition to the pro-
visions previously cited concerning Mr. Fitzpatrick's 
duty, the following paragraphs of that contract are re-
vealing (R. 25-26): 
"4. RESTRICTIVE CovENANT. During the continued 
employment and during the period of receipt of 
monthly payments herein provided, Fitzpatrick 
shall not, except with the written consent of the 
Board of Directors of the Corporation, be an offi-
cer, director, stockholder or employee of any cor-
poration, nor the owner of any business, nor the 
member of a partnership or a participant in any 
other firm of business organization, which is com-
petitive with the business of the Corporation. The 
opinion and determination of the Board of Di-
rectors of the Corporation shall be conclusive in 
respect of whether any other such business is com-
petitive with the business of the Corporation; pro-
vided, however, that neither Newspaper Agency 
Corporation, 143 South Main, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, nor any successor in interest thereof shall 
be considered a business competitive with that of 
the Corporation for the purpose of this agreement. 
17 
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'' 5. FoRFEITURE OF PAYMENTS. If Fitzpatrick fails 
to observe any of the terms of this agreement and 
continues such breach for a period of 30 days after 
the Board of Directors of the Corporation shall 
have requested him to perform the same, or if he 
breaches the provisions of paragraph 4 hereof 
and extends such breach by continuing in the com-
petitive business, as therein prohibited, for a 
period of 15 days after the Corporation shall have 
notified him in writing at his home address that 
the Board of Directors of the Corporation has 
determined that such business is in competition 
with the Corporation, then no further payments 
shall be due or payable by the Corporation here-
under either to Fitzpatrick or to his wife, Eleanor 
F. Fitzpatrick, and the Corporation shall have 
no further liability hereunder. 
"6. AssiGNMENT. Neither Fitzpatrick nor his 
wife shall have any right to commute, encumber 
or dispose of the right to receive payments here-
under, which payments and the right thereto are 
expressly declared to be non-assignable and non-
transferrable, and in the event of any attempted 
assignment or transfer, the Corporation shall 
have no further liability hereunder." 
~he~_e __ ~?~ti~_~_e:r:-cy-laden paragraphs alone would be_ 
su~cient _t~ _l'emove any possibility that this contract is 
an --~-~n~i_~y contract. _ 
A typical commercial annuity contract, payments 
under ·which are exempt, is to be found in the case of In 
re Cla.rk's Estate (1960), 10 Ut. 427,354 P. 2d. 112. This 
case, upon which plaintiff places considerable reliance, 
opens with the following statement of facts: 
''This case involves the question of taxability, un-
der Utah's inheritance tax statute, of moneys re-
18 
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ceived by a beneficiary under a death benefit 
clause of a retirement plan group annuity 
contract. 
''For a number of years prior, and up to the time 
of, his death, Frank Roundy Clark was an em-
ployee of Utah Oil Refining Company. That com-
pany had arranged with Equitable Life Assurance 
Society for the oil company's employees to be cov-
ered by a retirement plant group annuity contract. 
It provided that specified premiums should be 
paid, one-half by the employer and one-half by the 
employee, and that, upon retirement under speci-
fied conditions, the employee would be entitled 
to l_'eceive a lifetime annuity_ ... " 
This agreement is clearly not the same type of agree-
ment as that in the present case. The holding of the Clark 
Esta,te is simply that this agreement was an annuity and 
not a life insurance agreement. 
Not only does the Clark case involve a different type 
of agreement, but it concerns a different tax. It cannot 
be said, in all fairness, to have any relevance to the 
instant case. 
Plaintiff also relies on the Utah Insurance Code 
(31-11-2) which calls~!!~-!!~~~~~ "all agreements to make 
periodical payments where the making or continua11_c_~_ of_ 
all or some of tl!e _§~!i~-~ gf Sll:~Q_J!~__y_!!!_e:gt~_, ()I' tll_e -~Q@t 
of any such payment, is dependent upon the contjpuance 
of human life." Plaintiff correctly points out on page 18 
that this is not directly involved in the instant case. It is 
in an insurance context, set out merely to distinguish in-
surance payments from annuities. To literally use this 
definition as the basis of an annuity income tax exemp-
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tion would have consequences the legislature could not 
possibly have intended. For instance, a typical contract 
of employment would fit, since the employee's right to 
receive further payments for his work certainly depends 
upon a continuance of human life - his own. What 
\Yould happen to our income tax structure if everyone 
were entitled to deduct his salary as an exemption~ 
Some additional points raised in plaintiff's brief 
merit comment: 
1) On page 13, we read a statement to the effect that 
under the federal revenue laws passed in 1928 and 1932, 
''all periodical payments made pursuant to a contract 
whether annuities or installment payments for a speci-
fied term, were treated as excludable from income until 
the amount received exceeded the taxpayer's basis or 
capital investment in the contract.'' This is misleading 
inasmuch as the reference is to an annuity context. The 
statute provides for recovery of only premiums or con-
siderations paid, and the fact that the ageement involved 
would be the sort that would invQ_lve_jg_vestmegt_ of __ t}lis 
sorJ __ would _!_e!lci _t(__>_~talllp it-~§' __ an ann~lYJ-~~he!_than 
another type of installment arra!l~m_ent. 
2) Plaintiff urges interpretation of Utah tax law in 
terms of the federal law of the early 1930's. However, 
plaintiff does not want the ''relatively narrow and re-
stricted meaning . . . attached to the term 'annuity' '' 
(page 17) which was really part and parcel of such law. 
I 
Plaintiff would prefer reference-Towhat is assumed to be 
the liberal "present day definition" on this one point. 
The inconsistency of this argument and its effect on the 
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logical structure of plaintiff's brief need not be elabor-
ated upon. Nor is it necessary to point out the absence 
of case law supporting this definition on annuities in 
an income tax context. 
There is a long, impressive line of cases holding that 
payments received under deferred compensation and sim-
ilar contracts are not annuity payments. Most deal with 
the federal tax law after which ours was modeled. Per-
haps the leading case is Hooker v. Hoey, 27 F. Supp. 489, 
decided in 1939 by the Federal District Court of the 
Southern District of New York, affirmed without com-
ment at 107 Fed. 2d 1016. This case held that a pension 
or retiring allowance paid to a former employee because 
of past services was a form of compensation for personal 
service and constituted taxable income, and further that 
the annual compensation paid this employee upon his 
retirement for his services did not constitute an "an-
nuity" subject to exclusion from gross income. 
The court said : 
"It cannot be doubted that pensions or retiring 
allowances paid because of past services are one 
form of compensation for personal service and 
constitute taxable income to the recipients ... 
_ The courts have repeatedly hel~ additionaJ· -
compensation for past services is taxable income.'' 
(P~.190) 11 
''The exemption as to annuities does not cover 
~:where an annuit~ is..n.oJ in reality purchasedr 
even though the transaction may be somewhat ~ 
analogous to the purchasing of an annuity.'' 
(p. 491) 
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Of particular interest is the fact that the contract 
here involved was actually denominated an annuity agree-
ment. Indeed, many agreements which have been called 
annuities have been held by the courts not to he because 
they failed to meet the technical requirements therefor. 
Another typical case in which this situation is present is 
Wolfe v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1947), 8 
T. C. 689. 
A particularly revealing case in this line is that of 
the Estate of Mildred K. Hyde (1940), 42 B. T. A. 739. 
In return for deferred compensation, the taxpayer agreed 
not to enter into competition with her former employer. 
The Court said: 
''In the present case decedent by her agreement 
not to enter into competition with the candy com-
pany cannot be said to have purchased an annuity 
any more so that if the contract had provided on 
similar terms for the payment to her of compen-
sation for personal services. Such compensation, 
even though somewhat analogous to an annuity as 
in cases of bonuses or pensions, are nevertheless 
taxable income." ( p. 7 48) 
Other cases in this line which are particularly in-
structive are: Helvering v. Butterworth (1933), 290 U.S. 
365, 54 S. Ct. 221, 78 L. Ed. 365; Inland Steel v. N.L.R.B. 
(1948), 170 Fed. 2d 247; Commissioner of Corporations 
and Taxation v. Hale (1944), 315 Mass. 556, 53 N.E. 2d 
675; Clark v. Peterson (1955), 78 Ariz. 297, 279 P. 2d 451; 
Kneeland v. Administrator (1952), 138 Conn. 630, 88 Atl. 
2d 376; Burgseth v. Zinsma.ster Packing Co. (1958), 252 
Minn. 63, 89 N.W. 2d 172; Salz v. State Hou.se Commis-
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sian (1955) 18 N. J. 106, 112 Atl. 2d 716; State Tax Com-
mission v. Gray (1960), 340 Mass. 535, 165 N.E. 2d 404. 
The rationale behind the annuity exemption (and a 
good explanation why the contract in this case cannot 
qualify) is to be found in Jones v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue (1943), 2 T. C. 924: 
"The obvious intention of Congress in dealing 
with the three types of contracts [life insurance, 
endowment, annuity] was to permit the insured or 
annuitant and his beneficiaries to recover tax free 
the cost, i. e., the amount paid by them for the 
policy . . . only sums actually paid by the trans-
Je_r~~ may be recovered tax free.'' ( p. 933) 
In !fiOst of the cases to which reference has here been 
made, the protesting taxpayer was the ex-employee him-
self. That it makes no difference if it is his surviving 
widow under the present contract is demonstrated by the 
·--~ .. ---.!Ill.· 
cases dealing with payments to widows discussed under 
Point I of this brief. It has b~en. previously mentioned 
~~ --
that Mrs. Fitzpatrick is paying federal income tax on the 
amounts received under this contract. While this is ad-
mitted, the claim is forwarded that plaintiff is entitled 
to a compensating credit under a special provision of 
federal law (Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 691). 
This claim cannot be given a great deal of weight, be-
cause the record does not show that the plaintiff claimed 
such credit or, in fact, was entitled to claim it, and in 
addition thereto and more significantly, there is no com-
parable provision in Utah law. 
It is thus the contention of the Tax Commission that 
this contract is not an annuity, a semi-annuity, a quasi'-
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annuity, a constructive annuity, or to use the term pre-
ferred by plaintiff, an~uity in legal effe~_t. It is really 
a form of a contract of employment well out of the scope 
of the annuity exemption. Even if we were dealing with 
an annuity contract, plaintiff would not be entitled to an 
exemption, since the exemption allowed is only for pre-
miums or consideration actually paid. 
CONCLUSION 
The payments here involved came to plaintiff under 
the terms of a deferred compensation agreement entered 
into by her late husband and his former employer. Both 
parties to the contract were granted rights and privi-
leges; both assumed thereunder duties and obligations. 
These monies would have been income to him, and he-
cause they come to plaintiff under the terms of this con-
tract, made obligatory by the consideration he gave there-
·. for, they are income to her as well. As income, they are 
\proper subjects of income unless specifically exempted 
under Utah law. 
Plaintiff argues that the fact that an inheritance 
tax was paid on this contract makes the contract capital 
and, therefore, an inappropriate subject for income tax. 
This argument must fail because the payments are in 
fact income, and the value given the contract for inheri-
tance tax purposes does not represent, nor can it be sub-
stituted for, an actual investment which plaintiff might be 
entitled to recover. 
This contract is not an annuity, nor is it an annuity 
in legal effect. Payments made under its terms are not 
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.. 
entitled to exemption undeL.. ~e~ti~~ 59,:14-4(2) (h), ... ___/ 
U. C. A. 1953. Nor can exemption be properly claimed 
under any other provision of Utah law. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the decision 
of the State Tax Commission sustaining the deficiency 
assessment against plaintiff herein was proper and in 
order and should be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
M. REED HUNTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defenda;nt 
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